Hazardous Duty in Short Desertion: The Formulation of Military Law Concepts by Avins, Alfred
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 4 | Issue 2 Article 5
Hazardous Duty in Short Desertion: The
Formulation of Military Law Concepts
Alfred Avins
Copyright c 1963 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
Alfred Avins, Hazardous Duty in Short Desertion: The Formulation of Military Law Concepts, 4 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 129 (1963), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr/vol4/iss2/5
HAzARDous DuTY
HAZARDOUS DUTY IN SHORT DESERTION:
THE FORMULATION OF MILITARY LAW
CONCEPTS
ALFRED AvINs*
A. Lybrand's Case, Current Military Law Formation, and
Hazardous Duty in Short Desertion.
The traditional casenote is written a few months after
the decision is published. A year after the case is reported,
it is already like the autumn leaves, losing its vitality and
ready to drop to the earth, there to mix with the mass of the
law ts new cases press it out of focus. When two years have
elapsed, the opinion typically has grown as stale as last year's
snow. To discuss a case seventeen years old must seem like
a display of extraordinary procrastination.
Nevertheless, one can sometimes gain a new focus with
old glasses. This author has been a repeated critic of current
substantive military law formation, as being haphazard, unsci-
entific, and just plain out of touch with those considerations
which should be considered relevant. 1 However, in criticizing
the negative aspects of substantive military law formulation,
this author has not heretofore set forth in a step-by-step
analysis the means which military tribunals should use in
creating substantive military law. This methodology can best
be explored by focusing on a specific problem.
The problem of what constitutes "hazardous duty" in
military desertion affords an advantageous field for this endeav-
or. Article 85(a) (2) of the Uniform Code of MilitaryJustice2
*B.A., LL.B., LLM., M.L., J.S.D., Associate Professor of Law, Chicago-Kent
College of Law.
I Avins, Proof of Desertion Through Prolonged Absence, 44 CORNELL L. Q.
356, 376-7 (1959); Avins, The Joker in Jester: The Parris Island Death
March Case; 53 NORTHWESTERN UNIV. L. REV. 33, 58-9 (1918);
Avins, Military Leadership and the Law, 47 CALIF. L. REV. 828, 853-5
(1959); Avins, New Light on the Legislative History of Desertion Through
Fraudulent Enlistment: The Decline of the United States Court of Military
Appeals, 46 MINN. L. REV. 69 (1961).
2 10 U.S.C. § 885 (a) (2).
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makes it a capital crime in time of war for a serviceman to
go AWOL with intent to avoid "hazardous duty," as one
soldier whose life-span was considerably shortened by a
firing squad during World War II found out to his regret.3
The legislative history of the statute is singularly scanty as to
the meaning of the term "hazardous";4 the Manual for
Courts-Martial provides little more guidance.5 Accordingly,
the military courts are left to shift for themselves as best they
can, to formulate a definition of "hazardous" through case-
by-case analysis and application. The process through which
this common-law formulation of substantive military law is
carried on in this field provides a fruitful microcosm by which
methodology in military law-making can be studied.
Of all the cases involving the meaning of "hazardous
duty" in short desertion, Lybrand's case6 is the most worthy
of analysis in depth. A doubtful case, with a difficult fact
pattern, it presents a complex of problems which should have
produced a perceptive discussion. Instead the Board of
Review deciding it followed a stereotyped route to an unim-
pressive result. Although decided during World War II, the
problems this case raises are of current interest and importance.
This article will focus on that case, taking up first the Board
of Review's opinion, next the infirmities in which its route
resulted, and finally a more satisfactory solution to military
law formulation, in this area. From this, it is believed that
military law formulation in other areas can avoid the same type
of pitfalls.
B. A Haphazard Approach to Test for Hazardous Duty.
On November 3, 1943, Lybrand, the accused, was a mem-
ber of a company located in Sicily. On that date, when accused
went AWOL, it was common knowledge among members of
the company that they were preparing for overseas movement,
the general rumor being that the outfit was being shipped to
SETO 5555, Slovik, 15 ETO 151 (1945).
1 Avins, A History of Short Desertions, 13 MILITARY L. REV. 142,162 (1961).
5 manual for Courts-Martial, U.S., 1951, Exec. Order 10214, para. 164(a) (2),
at 311.
6 ETO 2368, Lybrand, 6 ETO 333 (1944).
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England. Between that date and November 7th, when accused
was returned to his organization, the company moved to a
staging area at Palermo, Sicily, a concededly non-hazardous
journey. Two days after accused was returned, the company
embarked on a transport and proceeded by water from Palermo
to Liverpool, England, without being subjected to enemy
attack or other hazard.
On the day accused was returned, he was asked why he
left. He told his commanding officer that "he was fed up"
with his unit and "had no intention of coming back until
after the 9th Division had left Sicily." He also informed the
officer that he wanted to get into a unit in Italy, and would
not have returned except for the fact that MP's apprehended
him. 7
Accused was charged with AWOL with "intent to avoid
hazardous duty, to wit: 'Movement overseas,' " as a violation
of the then short desertion statute. Faced with the problem of
proving this uneventful voyage to be hazardous, the prosecu-
tion at trial asked various company officers for their opinions.
For example, the company commander testified: "I don't
confess to be an authority as to whether or not it is hazardous,
but it does involve the chance of being torpedoed or hit by
a bomb." And the following colloquy occurred between the
prosecution and the executive officer:
"Q. Would the trip from Palermo to England be consid-
ered hazardous?
"A. . . . I don't believe at the time that we left that we
knew where we were going.
"Q. Would the ordinary overseas movement be con-
sidered hazardous?
"A. Yes . . . if you didn't know where you were going.
"Q. Then, at the time you were preparing for a move-
ment overseas, while still in Sicily, would that prospective
movement be considered dangerous?
7Id., at 336.
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"A. I think it would be."8
The unsatisfactory nature of the above evidence is patent.
A group of company grade infantry officers could hardly be
considered experts on ship sinkings or the chances of surviving
a sea voyage. Such information as they would have would no
doubt be based on rumor, fourth-hand hearsay, and whatever
isolated experiences they may have had. An opinion based
on such a lack of knowledge is valueless, and indeed prej-
udicial. The above officers were giving vent to personal fears,
rather than adding factual knowledge. They may have antic-
ipated danger although the seas had been swept clear of
enemy craft; contrawise, they may believe no danger existed
although submarines lurked at every turn and the enemy air
force was swarming about. Such subjective opinions are not
legal proof, and even the board of review seems to have been
unimpressed with this evidence.
Faced with a void in the record on the issue of hazard, the
board declares that "the heart of the case against accused is the
question whether the court was justified in taking judicial
notice that the journey by water from Palermo, Sicily, to
Liverpool, England,... was 'hazardous duty.' "9 The board's
road to thus dispensing with inconveniently absent evidence
commences with selections defining hazard from civilian
dictionaries, hardly an illuminating source in light of the
vague generalities to be found therein. 1 o
Next the board moves to civilian sources. "All navigation
is perilous," it says, citing a civilian case, '' a theory which
would obliterate the distinction between hazardous and non-
hazardous duty in the navy and in all army overseas move-
ments as well. Apparently unconvinced themselves by so
sweeping a doctrine, it postulates the "obvious" elements of
hazard involved in a wartime sea journey in a theater of opera-
s Id., at 336-7.
9 Id., at 339.
10 Extracted from these sources are the following: "Exposed to or involving
danger; perilous; risky" and "involving hazard or special danger." Id., at
340. This hardly advances the board's analysis at all.
11Moores v. Louisville Underwriters, 14 Fed. 226, 234 (C.C.W.D. Tenn.,
1882).
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tions. The board cites one civilian case for the proposition
that vessels are menaced by "removal for belligerent purposes
of all or any aids to navigation,"1 2 although there is not the
slightest shred of evidence cited to support the theory that
this alleged peril ever seriously endangered Allied shipping
during World War II. The board then cites a third case to
show the peril of submarines,13 and winds up by taking
judicial notice itself of the danger of enemy air action.
To start with, civilian precedents are generally inapplicable
to a determination of what hazardous duty is because they
look to one object while military law looks to another. In
the above cases, civilian courts were construing the terms of
marine insurance policies, and the loose language or generalized
observations in such a case do not bear on the question to
which short desertion is directed, viz.: how great must peril
be before men are deterred from their duty by it. But a greater
vice still is found in following these cases, for it constitutes a
crystal-clear example of the blind leading the blind. Here
military courts, presumably in the area of their specialized
expertise as to the hazards of war, are following civilian judges
with no such specialized knowledge. Such resort to militarily
untutored sources is surely an unsatisfactory method of formu-
lating sound military law concepts.
Of course, some facts of military significance are so well
known that even civilian judges cannot fail to perceive them.
Thus, in one case, a federal court held:
[The ship] was a part of a large convoy ...because it
was in waters infested by submarines and other naval
craft of the Axis Nations. The long lists of submarine
sinkings to which the public became accustomed during
the interval in question, can leave no doubt in the mind
of any thinking person but that our convoys traversing the
high seas were in every sense of the term, not only "in
the field," but in actual combat zones. . . . [The] vessels
were in constant and deadly peril during the voyage, [and]
12 Muller v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 246 Fed. 759, 762 (2d Cir., 1917).
13 Queen Ins. Co. of America v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 278 Fed. 770,
778, (S.D.N.Y., 1922), arid 282 Fed. 976 (2d Cir., 1922), aff'd 263
U.S. 487 (1923).
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he was passing through waters frequently the scene of
violent armed conffict. These facts are too well known to
be disregarded or waived aside. . The convoy was
simply a means of conveyance used by the army in bring-
ing up supplies and munitions through territory constantly
subject to enemy attack. Whether the road lay over land
or water and whether short or long could make no differ-
ence; the course traversed constituted a supply line to our
armed forces abroad, menaced throughout its length by
armed forces of the enemy. 14
But the above case referred to a trans-Atlantic convoy
during the early days of World War II, and indeed, during
that early period, shipping was hazardous. By the end of
1940, surface raiders in the North Atlantic cost the British,
Allied, and neutral merchant marines 86 ships sunk; in 1941
they sank 84 vessels more. German submarines sank 585
ships by the dose of 1940, and 432 ships in 1941. The Luft-
waffe accounted for 202 vessels up to the end of 1940, and
371 more in 1941. Mines dispatched 280 boats by the termi-
nation of 1940, and 111 additional craft in 1941.'
Axis depredations continued unabated during 1942. In
the first four months of that year, the German navy "pulled
off one of the greatest merchant ship massacres in history,"
sinking, through submarine action, 82 merchant vessels in
the Eastern Sea Frontier alone, together with 55 vessels in
the Bermuda area.' 6 Between March I and July 1, U-boats
knocked off another 160 to 170 ships in these two areas
alone.x 1 From September 1942, to the end of that year,
14 In re Berue, 54 F. Supp. 252, 255 (S.D. Ohio, 1944). See also McCune v.
Kilpatrick, 53 F. Supp. 80 (E.D.Va., 1943), where the court referred at
p. 84, to the "grave dangers from the land, the sky, and the sea." And in
Ex Parte Gerlach, 247 Fed. 616 (S.D.N.Y., 1917), the court at 617 de-
dared:
In this case he was on an Army transport, and peril from sub-
marines existed when he refused to stand watch. The captain in
charge of the vessel had, in my opinion, the right to call upon all
persons on board to protect the transport in any way that seemed
best in view of the danger.
25 10 MORISON HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS
IN WORLD WAR 114 (1956).
16 Id., at 7.
17 Id., at 8.
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convoys in the North Atlantic lost an average of 26 vessels
per month, and in early 1943, the rate was accelerated, rising
to an "all-time high" of 49 ships sunk in March by U-boats
out of 687 vessels in convoy. Between November 1st and
March 31st, Allied and neutral merchant ship losses reached
the "unprecedented figure" of 166 craft.,8 Under these
circumstances, it was indeed common knowledge that trans-
Atlantic voyages were perilous during the beginning of the
war.
But the board spreads the above common knowledge too
thin and too far. After using some loose language which
hardly rises to the level of obiter dicta 'from several military
cases, the board concludes that the court-martial need not
have presumed that a sea voyage was hazardous because judi-
cial notice could be taken thereof. Yet, in fact, far from it
being common knowledge that accused's shipping route was
hazardous, it was something which probably could not have
been proved at all, for the simple reason that in all likelihood
the perils of accused's voyage, which is the only one which
could have concerned the board, were probably slim indeed.
To appreciate the inapplicability of the above-mentioned
"common knowledge," it must be remembered that accused
was not embarking on a trans-Adantic passage through sub-
marine-infested waters, but rather was taking a Mediterranean
cruise. We must therefore examine the situation in that area,
and as of the latter part of 1943.
C. The True Background of Lybrand's Case.
In early May of 1943, the Axis forces were cornered in
the northeastern part of Tunisia, fighting with their backs to
the sea. On May 7th, Bizerte fell to the Americans, and two
days later, General Krause was forced to surrender 25,000 of
the Afrika Korps. A few days thereafter the remaining 150,000
Axis troops in Tunisia were captured. "Only a small number
of the enemy attempted to escape by sea, and owing to the
vigilance with which the Royal Navy carried out its patrols,
only a handful succeeded in crossing the Sicilian Straits."1o
18 Id., at 9, 65.
19 2 MORISON HISTORY OF UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERATIONS
IN WORLD WAR 1 260 (1947).
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So impotent was Axis sea power in the Mediterranean even
at this early date, that it was unable to ferry these troops across
the narrow Sicilian Straits and thus avoid a "loss ... considered
by the entire German Army to be a catastrophe second only
in magnitude to that of Stalingrad." 20 After Tunisia fell,
"Allied air and sea power were supreme throughout the
southern Mediterranean," and the British Vice Admiral at
Malta commented, "almost with a touch of pique," on the
failure of the Germans to attempt evacuation:
Two features of the operation are prominent. First,
the complete absence of any Axis men of war or shipping,
which was very disappointing, and, secondly, the manner
in which the Axis Air Forces deserted the theater of opera-
tions and left our destroyer patrols to operate without
inconvenience. 1
The growing ineffectiveness of Axis sea power was felt
in the submarine service during the Sicilian campaign. Al-
though the waters swarmed with Allied shipping, and the
Germans kept three to four U-boats operating around the
island all during this period, "the excellent anti-submarine
protection given by United States and British escorts, and
by planes of Coastal Command Northwest African Air Force,"
reduced Allied losses to the minuscule. 22 In turn, however,
Allied attacks almost wiped out Axis submarines. 2 3
German submarine power in the Mediterranean continued
to decline after the fall of Sicily. No more than 18 U-boats
at any one time operated in the whole sea after that date, and
they were subject to heavy losses due to the efficient Allied
20 ibid.
21 Id., at 259-260.
22 9 MORISON HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES NAVAL OPERA-
TIONS IN WORLD WAR II 41 (1954). The author also notes, at 38,
that an Italian naval "challenge to Allied sea supremacy at that point
would be hazardous, if not suicidal."
23 Id., at 40. And the author declares at 43:
All in all, the Axis submarines put in a miserable performance
Three U-boats and nine Italian submarines were sunk within
three weeks; and they had nothing to show for their sacrifice except
five merchant ships, a tanker, and two LSTs. Casualties on both
sides were remarkably few.
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detection system. 2 4  Between May and September 1943 an
average of 400 ships monthly sailed through the Tunisian
War Channel; the numbers increased so rapidly that in 1944
the figure was about 1200 a month, but during this whole
period from all this press of shipping, the Allies lost only
25 vessels to U-boats. 2 5 Between May 1943 and August 1944,
four surface vessels were sunk by German submarines in the
western Mediterranean, of which only one was a non-fighting
ship. 26 And Axis naval strength further declined on September
9, 1943, the day after the Italian armistice, when the whole
Italian fleet defected to the Allies. 27
Nor did Axis air power fare any better. On July 1, 1943,
their total strength which could be deployed in the theater
consisted of 600 Italian aircraft and about 780 German planes,
as against 3,680 American airplanes of the Northwest African
Air Force. The Luftwaffe then lacked torpedo bombers, and
as for the Regia Aeronautica, "the effect of the North African
campaign on [it] has been described as a hemorrhage."28
The picture continued to get progressively worse for the
Germans. The fall of Sicily, the invasion of Italy, and the
securing of Naples in Allied hands by October 1, 1943,29
deprived them of important airstrips. More bases were lost
when Sardinia and Corsica had to be evacuated in September
of that year. 30 The Italian armistice deprived them of further
air support.
German air attacks against Mediterranean convoys, de-
signed to stem the Allied build up in that theater, met with
"heavy losses and lack of success. ' 31 Often the Luftwaffe
would not only fail to sink any vessels, but it would be unable
to score any significant hits. 3 2 As an example of the effective-
24 10 MORISON 252.
25 Id., at 250.
2 6 Id., at 254-5.
27 9 MORISON 243.
23 Id., at 56-7.
29 Id., at 310.
so Id., at 304.
31 10 MORISON 264.
32 Id., at 266-7, 271-2.
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ness of Coastal Command, Northwest African Air Force, in
covering all convoys that passed Gibraltar, on June 26, 1943,
an eastbound convoy was attacked by over one hundred
German planes off Cape Bon, but Coastal's fighters kept
them so busy that not one ship was seriously damaged.33
The U-boat record in the Atlantic during the period in
question was equally dismal, and towards the end of 1943,
the Allies definitely gained the upper hand in the struggle. 34
Thus, between May and August of 1943, 16 submarines and
8 refueling ships for submarines were sunk, as against one
merchantman, in the central Atlantic." August was a banner
month for anti-submarine warfare; 26 U-boats were sunk,
as against only four merchantmen. 3o During 1944, 266 con-
voys crossed the North Atlantic with 12,907 ships and 1,945
escorts; only 10 were sunk by submarines.37 As Morison
declares:
In a speech to the House of Commons on 21 September
1943, Winston Churchill announced, with unusual gusto
even for him, that "for the four months which ended on
18th September, no merchant vessel was sunk by enemy
action in the North Atlantic. . . . During the first fort-
night in this September, no Allied ships were sunk by
U-boat action in any part of the world".
This oration was . . . broadcast around the world
[where] it evoked a cheer in many a United States ship
33 9 MORISON 59.
34 10 MORISON 244.
35 Id., at 128.
36 Id., at 132. And see p. 250, where the author recounts unprecedented Ameri-
can convoy success as follows:
In May 1944, when Operations Dragoon (invasion of South-
em France) was being prepared, these fast convoys were revived;
and from 1 July 1944 they departed Norfolk ... There were no
losses in these fast convoys.
Between December 1942 and March 1945, twenty-four UGF
convoys transported 536,134 troops from the United States to the
Mediterranean. Thirty... fast tanker convoys from the Caribbean
to the Mediterranean, with an average of seven tankers each, sailed
at 32-day intervals between February 1943 and June 1944 with no
loss or damage.
87 Id., at 328.
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engaged in convoy duty and brought joy to thousands of
people in the families of soldiers and sailors then afloat
on the great deep. 3 8
The above statistics make shaky indeed the cornerstones
upon which the board's assumptions rest. Far from showing
that a Mediterranean sea voyage was hazardous in late 1943,
they strongly point towards the opposite conclusion. It
appears from an examination of the overall naval picture at
the time accused was destined to sail that the probability
of his ship being sunk was exceedingly slim. If there was
anything to alter this picture in the case of accused's convoy, it
should have been brought out in evidence. Judicial notice cani
hardly serve as a substitute for facts which nobody knows. 39
True, it may be argued that a showing of some sinkings
shows potential hazard,40 which need not materialize in every
case to constitute hazardous duty. 41 But unless it materializes
in a sufficient number of cases to deter men from performing
their duty, it is not within the reason or rule of the short
38 Id., at 135-7.
39E TO 2396, Pennington, 6 ETO 351, 355-6 (1944).
40 Cf. ETO 5953, Myers, 16 ETO 57, 58-9 (1945):
The prosecution showed conditions of active combat, including
attack and counter attack, accompanied by heavy enemy fire, for the
night of 22 and 23 November. The record is silent as to specific
combat conditions on 25 November, except for evidence that ac-
cused's command was still in the same general territory and was
separated from the enemy by only 250 to 300 yards. . . . [T]he
general situation on 25 November, the date on which accused was
proved to have been absent from his command, was shown to have
been fraught with potential hazard so as to support the finding of
the court that ... accused absented himself from his command to
avoid hazardous duty.
4 1 In ETO 5803, Alexander, 16 ETO 1 (1945), the board declared at 4:
It was further shown that . . . accused's section was under
orders to perform a mission which involved the laying of a smoke
screen before a fort occupied by the enemy and it is clear that these
orders involved "hazardous duty," as alleged. The section had only
that morning returned to the company area after performing a simi-
lar mission during which it had been subjected to enemy fire. The
mission scheduled to begin on the evening of 19 November 1944
was to be performed in close proximity to the enemy and it was
anticipated that the section would again be fired upon. The mission
was actually performed within the range of enemy weapons and the
exposure to danger was obvious. The mere fact that the danger did
not materialize on this particular occasion does not mean that the
operation was not hazardous in nature.
1963]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [VOL. 4:129
desertion statute, for all human activities bear the seeds of
peril within their framework. But the statute cannot reach
that far, and nothing appears in this case on which to base an
intelligent dividing line. Furthermore, even were this con-
ceded arguendo, history still destroys one of the board's
basic premises, that overseas movement in an active theater
of operations is ipso facto hazardous,42 for no Allied mer-
chant shipping was sunk in that sea by U-boats after May
1944,43 although the theater remained the scene of bitter
combat for almost a year thereafter. And not even the most
extensive stretching of the concept of "hazardous duty"
could encompass a complete absence of risk.
All this assumes that loss of life must be great when a troop
transport is sunk, but experience teaches that it is not neces-
sarily so, for efficient rescue can reduce risk to a minimum. 44
Thus, in one of the worst North Atlantic battles of 1943, rescue
work despite heavy weather and fog was so good that out
of three American ships sunk by submarines only eight men
were lost.45 And on December 28, 1944, when a crowded
troopship was sunk by a U-boat off northern Britain, only six
men were lost. 46 If this record could be maintained in north-
ern wintery waters where the danger from heavy seas and
exposure is so great, the risk to life is even less in the quieter
and warmer Mediterranean during the fall. And, it must be
remembered, loss of shipping alone does not make duty
perilous; there must be risk to life as well as to equipment.
Finally, still another factor militates against risk in this
voyage. The convoy accused took was a westbound convoy.
Eastbound convoys were flooding the theater with American
troops and supplies from the United States, and their passage
could be easily spotted by .the swarm of Axis agents at the
Straits of Gibraltar. Westbound convoys were generally
ships which had already discharged their cargo. Would it
not be more likely for U-boats or the Luftwaffe to attack
cargo-laden ships about which they had received accurate
42 See 6 ETO 341.
43 10 MORISON 365, Appendix I.
44 See, for example, id. at 264.
45 Id., at 76.
46 Id., at 337.
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information in an attempt to relieve Kesselring's hard-pressed
forces in Italy than to strike generally at usually empty vessels
returning homeward without the benefit of intelligence from
spies? Is it reasonable to assume that Grossadmiral Doenitz
would have risked detection of his handful of submarines, or
Air Marshall Goering would have sacrificed more of the waning
Luftwaffe power in the Mediterranean, to send to the bottom
vessels whose only cargo could have been presumed
to be ballast? It seems fairly reasonable to assume that ac-
cused's route gave him further protection against peril.
Arrayed, then, against all of the above considerations,
the board sustains the finding that accused's duty was haz-
ardous based on the opinions of officers least likely to know,
on second-guessing, speculation, conjecture, and surmise,
on civilian authority considering entirely different questions,
on loose language taken from other cases not considering
the point, on a sweeping assumption which is not necessarily
correct, and finally, to cover all other deficiencies in the evi-
dence, on judicial notice of alleged facts which are not only
not common knowledge, but probably are contrary to fact
as well.47 The result is a completely haphazard method
reaching highly untrustworthy conclusions.
But the crowning touch is added by comparing the above
case to one arising in almost the identical geographical area,
but through accident decided by a board in the Mediterranean
Theater of Operations, which was undoubtedly more familiar
with the area than the board in the European Theater. Refer-
ring to an absence without leave from June 30, 1943 to July 8,
1943, from accused's unit in Algeria preparing to embark for
the invasion of Sicily, the board declared:
An "appropriate" specification alleging aggravated
47 Cf. NATO 3215, Lynch, 5 NATO-MTO 1 (1944), which suffers from the
same infirmities. The board there declared at 4:
The trial judge advocate requested the court to take judicial
notice that on 6 and 13 March 1944 water transportation from the
Naples area to the Anzio beachhead and service thereat might "be
considered hazardous duty," ... Although the request as made may
have- involved an element of a conclusion as distinguished from a
fact, the court could properly take judicial notice of conditions
existing near Naples and the Anzio beachhead at the time in ques-
tion and from such facts conclude the duty alleged was hazardous.
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absence without leave violative of Article of War 96 and
not charging the elements of desertion, . . . could of
course have been drafted. One form of such a specifica-
tion might have alleged mere absence without leave "with
intent to avoid embarkation for a sea voyage," a duty
not necessarily hazardous or important of itself as thus
charged. 4 8
Of course, unless a distinction can be made between some
sea voyages and others in the same area, and this must be
proved, if it is common knowledge that some sea voyages
are perilous, then all must be equally risky. And by the same
token, if some are not hazardous, others are equally safe,
absent evidence to the contrary. Therefore, reading the two
cases together, they hold that in June of 1943, right after the
fall of Tunisia, voyages in the Mediterranean were not hazard-
ous, but by November, after the Axis had lost vital air bases
in Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and Southern Italy, after the
Luftwaffe and U-boats had been materially reduced by Allied
action, and after the Italian armistice had deprived Germany
of the Duce's fleet and air force, sea trips had become so much
more perilous that it was common knowledge that they were
all hazardous. With these events as a premise for increased
German strength, not even Goebbels would have dared to
make this claim.
D. Scientific Testingfor Hazardous Duty
With the above case as a striking example of how not to
determine whether a particular duty is hazardous, we turn
now to examine more reliable tests. In doing so, we will use
as a starting point another case from the same theater.
In Urban's case 49 accused was a top-turret gunner of a
bomber engaged in strategic bombing over the interior of
Germany. On August 16, 1944, while on a mission to Leipzig,
the plane encountered intensive flak and received direct hits.
The mission was considered "rough" and "very severe"
by the crew. On previous missions, the plane had been at-
tacked by enemy fighters. Thereafter, accused went AWOL.
48 MTO 6543, Thacker, 7 NATO-MTO, 47, 54 (1945).
49 ETO 4138, Urban, 12 ETO 1 (1944).
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The board declared:
Flying as a member of a combat crew on combat missions
to targets in territory on the continent occupied by the
enemy constitutes . .. hazardous duty. . . The dangers
attendant upon the performance of such duty are shown
by the evidence and are so commonly known that judicial
notice may be taken of them. (CM ETO 2368, Lybrand.) r o
While once again, citing the prior case of the sea voyage
dissected above, the board takes judicial notice that the duty
is hazardous, this time at least it refers to competent evidence
in the record of specific dangers to which the accused had
been subject. Certainly, evidence of perils in accused's partic-
ular, duty is evidence that the duty is hazardous generally,
just as evidence of lack of prior dangers is evidence of the
converse. However, as pointed out above, neither is con-
clusive, for some will escape the most dangerous tasks un-
scathed, while others will be injured in the safest activities.
The old saw about the veteran who goes through the whole
war without a scratch only to slip on a banana peel in front
of his home and break his bones is recognition of this truism.
We turn then to a scientific method of proving that flying as a
crew member of a combat aircraft is hazardous duty.
The reason, interestingly enough, why statistics are avail-
able to show that flying is hazardous has nothing to do with
military justice, but rather stems from the desire of the service
to retain flight pay. In urging on Congress the fact that flight
pay is justified by the hazard of flying, resulting in a shortened
life expectancy for pilots, 51 and is not "just a bonus for flying,"
as many Congressmen had believed, the service representatives
were not content with merely asking Congress to take judicial
501d., at 6. And see ETO 10363, Mangiapane, 22 ETO 235, 238 (1945);
CM 270352, Uyechi, 45 BR 233, 235 (1945).
51 Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Armed Services, House
of Representatives, on H.R. 2553, Career Compensation for the Uniformed
Forces, 81st Cong., 1st Sess. 1573 (1949) :
ACUARIAL STATISTICS ON FLYING PERSONNEL
The life expectancy of an individual who enters a flying career
at age 22 is 12 years less than an individual of the same age who
chooses a nonflying career. The flier can expect to live to age 58;
the nonflier can expect to live to age 70.
Expressed another way, one out of four individuals who enter
a flying career at age 22 will be dead before they reach age 40.
The nonfliers will not suffer this attrition until they reach age 61.
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notice of the flying hazards, or calling as a witness an infantry
officer who had once been a passenger on a military plane.
Rather, they responded to a request for actuarial statistics
from one committee member,52 and figures were supplied.
Thus, instead of haphazard proof based on speculation, sus-
picion, and surmise, there were introduced reliable figures con-
cerning the hazard.
During World War II, the mean strength of Army Air
Corps flying officers was 122,823 and the mean strength of
enlisted crew members was 100,332. Of the officers 23,551
were killed in combat and 27,701 enlisted men were killed
in combat. An additional 16,313 Air Corps officers and men
were killed in noncombat airplane crashes. 53 During this
period, 90 Air Force general officers personally led their forces
in combat, of whom 10 were killed.54
A comparison of flying duty in wartime with other duty
shows that all members of the Army are not equally exposed
to hazard. The combat fatality rate for Army flying personnel
between December 7, 1941 and December 31, 1945, per thou-
sand per annum, was 49.9 for officers and 69.45-for enlisted
men, total 58.24, for nonflying officers it was 5.62, for men
6.83, total 6.74.5s These figures, showing that the combat
fatality rate of flying personnel was over nine times the rate
of ground personnel, compare air crews with the rest of the
Army as a whole, which includes service troops who were not
particularly exposed to combat. The following table compares
all combatant arms: 56
52 Id., at 1572.
5 A Id., at 1623. Expressing this another way, 303 out of every thousand Air
Corps flying personnel members were killed in combat or aircraft accidents.
Id., at 1624.
54 Id., at 1632.
55 Id., at 1588.
56 Id., at 1633. See also the following at the same place:
Since the majority of Air Force flying -personnel are officers,
the World War II statistics on officer deaths and casualties, as pub-
lished by the Adjutant General of the Army, are particularly perti-
nent. Over two-thirds of the officers of the Army, including Air
Corps, who were killed in combat during World War II, were Air
Force flying personnel. (Out of a total of 34,645 Army officer com-
bat fatalities, 24,119 were Air Force flying officers.) Over half of
the officer casualties in the entire Army were Air Force flying per-
sonnel, and over three-quarters of the officers captured or interned
were Air Corps flying officers.
1963] HAZARDOUS DUTY 145
COMBAT FATALITIES BY COMBAT ARMS, U. S. ARMY
AND AIR CORPS, December 7, 1941 to July 31, 1945
[Combat death rate per 1,000 per annum]
Officers Enlisted men
Air Corps, flying ..................... 47.9 69.0
Infantry ............................. 28.3 27.7
Cavalry ............................. 17.8 14.5
Field Artillery ........................ 9.4 4.9
Coast Artillery Corps ................. 1.7 1.3
In addition to combat fatalities expressed above, Air Corps
crew members suffered a fatality rate, per thousand per annum,
due to aircraft accidents alone, of 15.7, while the fatality rate,
per thousand per annum, of the rest of the Army due to all
non-combat causes, was only 2.4. 57
Nor is military flying devoid of risk even in time of peace.58
Increasing aircraft speeds have increased the ratio of fatalities
to major aircraft accidents. While in 1930, there was an
average of one fatality for each 13 accidents, the ratio became
57Id., at 1587-8.
58 Id., at 1590, 1592. And see the following statement at 1631:
The hazards of military flying are clear and demonstrable.
Moreover, despite advances in aircraft design and vigorous safety
measures, the hazards of military flying have not decreased.
There are two main reasons for this sustained level of risk in
military flying. First, to design, develop, and employ aircraft of
maximum combat capability must be our primary objective. Un-
fortunately, combat performance and design safety factors do not
go hand in hand. The aircraft with highest combat performance is
generally the most dangerous to fly. Second, is the necessary opera-
tion of these new and higher performance aircraft types under more
extreme conditions of altitude, speed, and weather, which imposes
greater physical and psychological stresses upon the pilot and crew.
These factors are in exact opposition to safety and the repetitious
route flying of commercial air lines.
There is a general tendency to assume that all aviation is be-
coming safer. By 1946, the rate of passenger fatalities in commer-
cial aviation had decreased to approximately one-sixth of what it
had been 10 years before.
Data of the CAA and the Actuarial Society of America indi-
cate that, on a comparable basis, the death rate of military pilots
is over 20 times that of commercial airline pilots. For each 100,000
airplane hours flown in the military services, 9.6 pilots were killed.
For each 100,000 hours of commercial airplane flying, 0.4 pilots
were killed.
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1 to 8 in 1947, 1 to 6 in 1951, and 1 to 5 in 1954.5 9 The jet
fatality rate for all services is 16 per hundred thousand flying
hours, as against 8 for conventional aircraft. 6o Thus, not-
withstanding a cut in the major accident rate into a quarter
of its former size in twenty years, the fatality rate has not
declined. 61 Jet flying "has been termed by the President of
the United States and by insurance companies as the most
hazardous major occupation in the United States today."6 2
Wartime submarine service is almost equally hazardous.
Out of every thousand American submariners, 245 lost their
lives,6 3 as compared to the surface vessel fatality rate of 38.6 4
There have been almost no casualties during peacetime; 66
While the safety of civil aviation has increased, it appears that
military flying is more dangerous now than it was prior to World
War II. During the 11 years preceding the war the death rate of
Regular Army (Air Corps) pilots was 9.6 per thousand per year,
as compared with a 2-year postwar death rate of 12 per thousand,
an increase of 25 percent.
A brief review of present trends shows that no decrease in
military flying fatalities can be expected in the foreseeable future.
Supersonic speed with jet propulsion, rocket propulsion with its
problems of compressibility, methods of escape through ejection
and the effects of accelerative and decelerative gravity forces as they
approach human limits, are an integral part of current and future
military flying. These contributing factors to the hazards of military
aviation are in addition to those we have always had, such as non-
scheduled, off-airways navigation, arctic, formation, and bad-weather
flying, dive-bombing, strafing, and other operational training activi-
ties.
The magnitude of the aircraft accident fatality rate is illus-
trated by the fact that month in and month out, since VJ-day, an
average of between two and three aircrew members have been killed
per day in aircraft accidents.
Nonflying Air Force or other military personnel are not ex-
posed to sudden death as are flying personnel. In 1947, the rate
of death of Air Force flying personnel, due to aircraft accidents
alone, was over five times as great as the death rate due to all causes
of Air Force nonflyers. (Deaths per 1,000 per year, Air Force flyers
due to aircraft accidents alone, 10.3; deaths per 1,000 per year, Air
Force nonflyers, all causes, 2.)
59 Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, on
H.R. 4720, Career Incentive Act of 1955, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 61 (1955).
60 Id., at 116-7.
61 Id., at 119.
62 Id., at 178. See also p. 61.
63 Supra, note 51 at 1629.
64 Supra, note 59 at 172.
65 Id., at 172-3.
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a fact which belies the assertion that "the hazard is always
there,"66 for without risk there can be no hazard. However,
the injury rate runs 50 percent higher than on other vessels
because of cramped quarters,8 7and it has been predicted that
the advent of atomic submarines will enhance the risk. 6 8
The above pattern of statistics constitutes an exact and
scientific method for determining hazard, as well as com-
parative hazard. In place of guesswork, conjecture, and
all-embracing, but equally unreliable, "judicial notice," the
use of statistics showing casualty rates substitutes mathe-
matically accurate data by which the degree of hazard can be
uniformly measured for all military duties. Such information
is far more desirable than any other way of determining danger.
Casualty and fatality rates, having a universality of application
and being easily compared, constitute the standard criteria
which ought to be used in determining whether a particular
activity is or is not dangerous duty.
E. Conclusion
The concept of hazardous duty in short desertion consists,
upon dose analysis, of three parts, viz.:
(1) The casualty or fatality rate for those engaged in the
duty. This is a purely statistical inquiry.
(2) The number of personnel who will be deterred from
performing that duty by such rate of injury or death. This is
in part a statistical inquiry coupled with sociological and
psychological considerations.
(3) Whether the defection rate stemming from the casualty
rate is sufficiently high to warrant imposition of the special
short desertion penalty. This is primarily a value-judgment
based on personnel policy and duty-requirements consider-
ations.
It can thus be seen that the concept of "hazardous duty"
is not a static factor. It is neither undeviatingly tied to any
66 Ibid. See also p. 174.
87 Ibid.
68 Id., at 34, 68, 174.
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particular type of duty, even combat duty, especially where
the enemy has been rendered impotent, nor is it invariably
tied to a particular casualty rate at all times. Rather, it is a
concept flexible enough to meet the need for which it was
created, to keep military personnel performing their duties
even when risk became great. As such, it constitutes the sum
total of an evaluation of all of the aforementioned factors in
relation to each other. Only by so applying the short desertion
statute can the law be kept uniform in application and ra-
tional in result.
The analysis herein, by pointing the way to a more reliable
test for "hazardous duty," will, it is believed, provide in
addition through an exhibition of the approach to be used, a
guide for the more rational formulation of military law con-
cepts generally. This methodology in turn will result in more
satisfactory military law principles, ones which at once define
standards of conduct with understandable yardsticks, and
deter only derelictions which require it.
